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| Federal Empowerment or Deepening Centralization |
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Negotiating Diversities through Institutional Strategies
The increasing ‘dialectics of ethnicity and territoriality’(1) has effected a reformulation in our conventional notions of representation and accompanying institutional arrangements. The global transformations in the democratic agenda wherein there is an increasing emphasis upon ‘particular concerns’ and ‘situated self’, insist upon a ‘normative shift’ in strategies for political self-determination. The upshot of such a development has been that many multiethnic states have been forced to (re)structure policy initiatives and institutional strategies that have often split the ‘sovereign claims’ of a state amongst numerous institutional constituents. Many of these institutional arrangements justified most often through the ‘historic rights argument’(2) conjoined with the ‘injustice argument’(3) sanction not only the control of such institutions by culturally distinct groups but also attempts to insulate them from being subjected to political and other forms of exploitation released from a conventional liberal ‘concern for generalities’.(4) |
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| While Articles 370, 371A,(8) 371C(9) and 371F(10) made special provisions for ‘segmental autonomy’ with respect to the states of Jammu & Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur and Sikkim; the Fifth and Sixth schedules establish ‘state-like institutions’ in certain ‘scheduled areas’(11) of the country. These institutions empowered through these articles and schedules were to provide certain ‘tribal’ communities a measure of ‘self-rule’ through the introduction of councils that would nurture the customary law, practices and institutions of these communities. While the Fifth Schedule deals with the administration of scheduled areas in states other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram, the Sixth Schedule deals with the administration of the latter mentioned states. Interestingly, new entities like the Gorkha Council in Darjeeling (West Bengal) are clamouring for Sixth Schedule status, since they consider that this schedule provides the groups with a larger measure of autonomy than that provided by the Fifth Schedule. Our concern in this presentation would be the 6th schedule and its functioning in the context of Meghalaya, which from being an ‘autonomous state’ within Assam in 1969 to a separate state in 1972 is an interesting case where Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) for the three major tribes function alongside a full-fledged state granted in deference to claims for such a state by these three major tribes. Since the underlying principle for the constitution of such councils under the Sixth schedule was to provide a measure of autonomy to tribes in states where they were a minority, the functioning of such councils in the state of Meghalaya raises doubt about the relevance and implications of their functioning in a state where the majority tribes enjoy ironically the protective mechanism intended for ‘national minorities’.(12) The evolution of such institutions is considered to lie in the colonial designs that proposed to control the ‘semi-civilised’ frontiers indirectly(13) though institutions that had all the modern trappings but was to euphemistically nurture the ‘traditional’ system of governance; pursued with nuanced alterations by the colonial and post-colonial state. The post-colonial state adopted these enactments and institutions as a negotiation between political expediency for pursuing the integration process(14) and a bequest of anthropological paternalism.(15) In other words, the post-colonial state confronted with increasing political challenges laced with subtle hints at secession from politicised ethnicities and a paternalist and exoticised perception about the ‘historical state’ of certain communities adopted a syncretistic normative and institutional strategy that ensured a balance between ‘conditions of unity (with) requisites for modernization.’(16) The colonial link to these institutions can also be established by highlighting the fact that it was the Cabinet Mission that suggested the formation of an Advisory Committee to suggest strategies for the adminis-tration of the tribal and excluded areas. It was in pursuance of these recommendations that the Constituent Assembly formed an Advisory Committee which subsequently appointed a sub-committee more popularly known as the Bordoloi Sub-committee to suggest such measures. This report submitted to the constituent assembly in early 1948 was termed as the Draft 6th Schedule. The underlying principle of this subsequently adopted report was to provide a separate administrative model for the tribal areas of the Northeast in order to protect them from political and economic exploitation, preservation of their distinct ways of life and establishment of a format of governance that could allow them to manage their own political affairs.(17) In short, these institutions and legal protections were to approximate conditions of ‘self-rule’, whereby a secure cultural context of these distinct communities could be attained through a secure political context;(18) and the Sixth schedule was to provide such a context. Nonetheless, while the establishment of such institutions was purportedly in deference to a claim for autonomy and ‘recognition’ of distinct communities and groups, the unqualified rationale was integrating these communities and groups with an evolving national politico-institutional consciousness. The allusion of such a view is apparent in the statement of Purushottam Das Tandon in his presidential address to the Nasik Session where he states that ‘the different parts of the country while retaining the good points of their local administration should be bound to one another… and should tend to come closer to one another.’(19) Therefore, the general view was that an autonomy arrangement must be girded by a common politico-institutional arrangement between the autonomous areas and the polity. A scholar sums up the pervading attitude that inspired such an arrangement very succinctly when he proposes that Bordoloi though basically an ‘integrationist’ was not an ‘assimilationist’,(20) and the Sixth Schedule proposed to attain such an objective. The Autonomous District Councils formed under the provisions of the 6th schedule began to operate in Meghalaya since 1952, when these areas were under the state of Assam. Beginning with two councils for the Garo people and the united Khasi-Jaintia people, the council for the Khasi-Jaintia people had to be bifurcated in order to accommodate the political desires of the Jaintia people who began to purportedly perceive the dominance(21) of the Khasis upon their autonomy. While the objective of the Sixth schedule institutions were to insulate the traditional way of social and political life and codify customary practices in order that the ‘embedded life-worlds’ provide the context of the social, economic and political experience of the ‘tribal people’; the actual working of these councils in the context of the formation of a new state for these dominant tribes as well as the intrusion of modern political practices and processes have led to a substantial erosion in the legitimacy of these institutions. In fact, it can candidly be asserted that there is a surfeit of political institutions in the state of Meghalaya which, in an inimitable way, have resulted in not only functional overlap but have also resulted in intra-institutional power struggle. The institutions of the state, the institutions of the district councils, the institutions of municipal corporations and the institutions of traditional governance represented in the Syiems in the Khasi Hills, Nokmas in Garo Hills, Dolois in Jaintia Hills and the lower local level institutions are all locked in a dynamic yet irreconcilable clash of institutional egos. These conflicts are girded by historical and legal lapses in the coherent identification of jurisdictional and operational boundaries of these institutions as well as open-ended status of certain historical questions like political settlement of the Khasi State’s Merger issue and the role of the traditional Chiefs or Syiems.(22) As the district councils were mandated to regulate and rationalize the traditional governing institutions and customary practices, the traditional Chiefs came under the legal and political ambit of the district councils vide the Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headman Act 1959 of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) or the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating Act 1958, amended in 1972. These acts authorises the councils to rationalise the ‘appointment’ and ‘succession’ of the traditional Chiefs who customarily must belong to a particular clan.(23) In contemporary times, these acts have resulted in a series of legal complications and questioning of the ‘traditionality’ of the actions of the councils when with the introduction of this law, especially in the case of KHADC areas, an ‘acting chief’ can be ‘appointed’ from any clan(24) or even an incumbent Syiem can be ‘suspended’ by the council, both of the instances are cited as violations of customary laws. These intercessions by the district council are not only viewed as violations of traditional practices and processes but results in the emergence of ‘class fractions’ amongst the traditional leaders who subsequently get embroiled in internal power struggles for control of the traditional institutions. The conflict between the council and the Syiem of Mylliem,(25) Laborious Manik Syiem, after his suspension by the council is a case in point. In fact, scholars attribute this power-struggle between these two organs of traditional governance mainly to the control of revenue in resource-rich areas and Mylliem Syiem-ship, being the richest, has had more number of such problems.(26) This is partially true since conflict on such issues between the Syiems and the ADCs have taken place in other areas as well and therefore more nuanced view of this struggle must be taken in order to be able to articulate the deeper questions involved in such struggles. Besides, the conflict over the sharing of revenue and control of resources has been another area of conflict between the traditional governing elite and the modern institutions like the district councils. Instances of such conflict can be had from the recent controversies regarding the installation of toll tax gates by the KHADC as well as the Syiem-ships(27) or the question of issuing of trading licenses by the council in areas that have traditionally been the domain of the Syiems.(28) If truth be told, social commentators have actually condemned the rising material interests of the traditional authorities and accused them to exploiting the material wealth of the state for self- aggrandisement.(29) These conflicts are not simply ‘clash of collective ego’ as Choudhury(30) terms them to be but are conflicts between two sets of institutions that derive their political legitimacy from two opposing sources. While the traditional chiefs draw their legitimacy from ‘an attitude of reverence and duty towards the practices and values transmitted from the past;’(31) the district councils draw their legitimacy from a liberal constitutional mandate accountable to a popular electorate. This contest between two opposing forms of legitimacy is a necessary instance in this presentation since the power struggle that ensues between these two sets of authority is to be traced to the interstices of the two contra forms of political legitimacy. The traditional Khasi Syiems have been incessantly claiming their autonomy from the fact that no merger agreement was signed between the 25 Khasi states and the post-colonial state and the terms set in the Instrument of Accession and its Annexed Agreement.(32) The popular perception regarding this issue of the ‘independence’ of the 25 Khasi states have dominated political discourse and practice in the state when Federation of Khasi States(33) succeeded in nominating a common candidate to represent their interests in the parliament but failed to receive adequate encouragement from the regional parties or the electorate. The Garo Nokmas and Jaintia Dolois traditional heads have lent support to this struggle of the Khasi Syiems but have not been as vocal as their latter colleagues. Interestingly, the ironic twist to this debate is provided by the fact that the Federation of Khasi States intended to argue their case by sending a representative to the Indian parliament, an institution that it understatedly considers an imposition of the ‘traditional’ institutions and norms. At another level, the ADCs are authorised to regulate and rationalise the local traditional governance popularly known as the Dorbar Shnongs in Khasi Hills (locality councils) which is headed by a Rangbah Shnong (Local Elder) along with an executive. The appointment of the Rangbah Shnong of these councils is required to be endorsed by the District Councils and there have been instances of conflict between these institutions, too. Moreover, in many cases, especially in the KHADC areas, these local level authorities have been assigned oblique legal authority to endorse and perform juridical and executive tasks that often are considered as ethnically biased. In fact memos of the KHADC supports this claim that ‘recommendations’ and ‘No-Objection certificates’ for trading and other activities by the Members of the District Councils and the Local Headman are ‘extra constitutional’, yet argue that they are being allowed to do so as a matter of courtesy.(34) These councils have also been at loggerheads with the institutions of the state on numerous occasions that also has a legal and political control over these institutions. Though intended possibly to maintain a check over one another, these institutions have merely complicated the political discourse and political practices. The importance in highlighting these instances is not to establish their legality or illegality but emphasise the fact that lack of proper articulation of the rights, duties and scope of authority of all these institutions have not only increased the complexity of the social and political order through the creation of layers and layers of ruling elite but have resulted in functional overlaps between cascading institutions. The ADCs have apparently been also responsible for freezing and reinforcing the ethnic exclusions by initiation of certain acts which are often perceived as high-handedness justified in the name of law. The councils are empowered by the provisions of the schedule to regulate the trading by ‘non-tribals’ in these ‘tribal’ areas and as such ‘survey/checking’ of non-tribal traders are part its legal responsibilities. Yet while the provisions of the law allows the ‘enforcement officer’ of the council to make such verifications, the ethnically polarised public space and unlawful intervention by pressure groups(35) often results in the collapse of civil laws and initiation of inter-ethnic schism that disturbs ethnic peace. Interestingly, the council in its internal memos ascribe these commotions to the lack of a proper demarcation of the functional jurisdictions of institutions like the Municipal Corporations and the District Councils and their spatial scope.(36) Besides, the councils are seen to have deliberately excluded the genuine ‘citizens’ of the state who happen to be ‘non-tribals’ from participating in the political process of the councils. The ‘non-tribal’ electorate of these councils are deleted as voters from the electoral list(37) although there are no legal provisions for allowing such denial of political enfranchisement. This institutional exclusion, in fact reinforces, dominant cognitive prejudices often expressed in arguments that attempts to deny any civil and political privileges to groups considered as ‘others’.(38) In lieu of a conclusion, we may simply state that the experiences of autonomy for the ‘traditional authorities’ in Meghalaya have raised uncertainties about the ability of such institutions to effectively insulate the traditionality and customary practices and processes of ‘embedded’ societies, especially in a globalising world because of their deep imbrications with institutions and values that fail to crystallize with the current mutated notions of traditionality. Besides the staggered democratic consensus that was possibly the intended objective of such institutions continues to be elusive because of the lack of functional and institutional clarity. Yet we may say that these institutions have provided institutionalised settings through which negotiated compromises can be achieved between two opposing set of actors. |
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NOTES & REFERENCES: 4.See, Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference, (Cambridge: Polity Press), (1993), pp.129–30. 5.Ghai, op.cit., pp. 8–10. 6. S.K. Chaube, ‘The Ethnic and Social Bases of Indian Federalism’, Occasional Paper, No.17, (Calcutta: CSSS), January 1978, p. 7. 7. Ibid., p. 27. 8. Vide the 13th amendment to the constitution. 9. Vide the 27th amendment to the constitution. 10.Vide the 36th amendment to the constitution. 11. D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, (NewDelhi: Prentice Hall of India), 1983, pp. 248–9. |
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